The Human Person and Objective Good Faith in Contract Relations by Filho, Jose Carlos Moreira de Silva
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 25
Number 2 Penn State International Law Review Article 3
9-1-2006
The Human Person and Objective Good Faith in
Contract Relations
Jose Carlos Moreira de Silva Filho
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Filho, Jose Carlos Moreira de Silva (2006) "The Human Person and Objective Good Faith in Contract Relations," Penn State
International Law Review: Vol. 25: No. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol25/iss2/3
The Human Person and Objective Good
Faith in Contract Relations*
Jose Carlos Moreira da Silva Filho**
The "repersonalization" of private law in Brazil holds particular
significance for the law of contract relations. The objective principle
of good faith is the main nexus between the emerging notion of the
dignity of the human being and the ordering of contract relations. In
this article, Professor da Silva deepens the discussion of the concept
of the "person" in light of its biological, legal and philosophical
aspects. He finds a promising perspective for the person as legal
subject in the philosophical concept of "selfhood" that recognizes
otherness. Building a concept of "selfhood'" based on the principles
of philosophical hermeneutics and alterity, he establishes an
adequate space in which contract relations may be positioned as part
of the ongoing "repersonalization" of private law in the Brazilian
legal system.
* This article is a revised translation of Jos6 Carlos Moreira da Silva Filho, Pessoa
Humana e Boa-F6 Objetiva nas Relaq6es Contratuais: a alteridade que emerge da
ipseidade, in II CONSTITUICAO, SISTEMAS SOCIALS E HERMEN]UTICA-ANUARI0 DO
PROGRAMA DE POs-GRADUACAO EM DIREITo-2005 113-136 (Leonel Severo Rocha &
Lnio Luiz Streck eds., Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado 2005), ISBN:85-7348-428-4.
Professor Francis J. Mootz III of Penn State Dickinson School of Law worked with
Professor da Silva to revise his initial rough translation of the published article, and so the
current article likely is substantially different in form (but not in substance) from the
original.
This article is part of Professor da Silva's larger research project, "Contract
Relations: In Search of a New Legal Model Based on the Ethics of Alterity and
Philosophical Hermeneutics," which is funded by Universidade do Vale do Rio dos Sinos
(UNISINOS).
** Professor in the Post-Graduate Program in Law at the Universidade do Vale do
Rio dos Sinos (UNISINOS). Professor da Silva received his Bachelor Degree in Law
from Universidade de Brasilia (UnB), his Masters in Theory and Philosophy of Law at
Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC), and his Doctorate in the Law of Social
Relations from Universidade Federal do Parana (UFPR). He may be reached at
josecarlosfilho@terra.com.br.
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I. Introduction'
The principle of objective good faith in contract law is one of the
richest themes in contemporary Brazilian jurisprudence. Objective good
faith is not simply a feature of the legal regulation of economic relations
between two persons. Rather, it highlights fundamental juridical themes
that are now emerging with great promise. As the principle is
continually refined, objective good faith is being recognized as a
constitutive principle of the legal system. In particular, objective good
faith persistently establishes the need to question the autonomy and self-
sufficiency of the legal system by indicating the close connections it has
to the ethical and political systems.2 Additionally, the principle of
objective good faith plays an important role in rethinking the appropriate
manner of understanding, interpreting and applying legal texts and norms
to particular situations.
3
However, this new significance of the principle of objective good
faith extends beyond legal practice and also plays an important role in
the academic debates concerning the "repersonalization" of Civil Law.
1. Editor's Note: As a service to our readers, the Editorial Board normally checks
cited material for both "Bluebook" form and substance." Parts of this article rely on
sources not available in English. Those sources were unable to be "source-checked" in
the traditional law review sense, but have been checked for "Bluebook" form. Wherever
possible, English translations were obtained and checked. These translations are
indicated after the citation to the original source.
2. When describing the philosophy of law as a practical philosophy, Albano Pepe
frames this issue in precise terms. The "norm-setting amalgam" that existed in the Greek
world was self-justified because it was a unitary system. In contrast, in modernity law is
grounded on the dogma of the
... relative emancipation of the legal system in contrast to the other norm-
setting orders and other social sub-systems like ... religion, morality, etiquette
and social usages, magic, the ownership of goods and wealth, [and] friendship.
This 'autonomy' of the legal system, this self-referential character, creates a
proper realm of law that is distinct from other norm-setting orders.... When
insulating itself in this manner, law doesn't lose links with ethics and politics,
but it is able to present itself to the social system as dealing with ethical and
political questions in a distinctive, autonomous manner. The special role for a
philosophy of law, seen as rhetorical in nature, is to recapture the "forgotten"
links between law, ethics and politics that are fundamental to a democratic
polity.
Albano Marcos Bastos Pepe, A Filosofia do Direito e a Filosofia Preitica-o Ethos
Enquanto Mundo Compartilhado: a Questdo da Legitimidade no Direito, [The
Philosophy of Law and Practical Philosophy-Ethos in its Condition in a Shared World:
a Question of Legitimacy in Law] 116 f. Tese at 20-21 (Curitiba, 2002) (Ph.D. thesis,
Federal U. of Parana) (on file with author). This article takes a similar approach to the
role of law.
3. See Jost CARLOS MOREIRA DA SILVA FILHo, HERMENtUTICA FILOSOFICA E
DIREITO: o EXEMPLO PRIVILEGIADO DA BOA-FE OBJETIVA NO DIREITO CONTRATUAL,
[Philosophical Hermeneutics and Law: the Privileged Example of Objective Good Faith
in Contract Law] (2nd ed., Rio de Janeiro: Lfmen Jris 2006).
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This article will address this significance in detail. Although contract
law in the United States is shaped by notions of autonomy and
individualism, the legacy of contract law in Brazil is rooted in patrimony.
The current effort to "repersonalize" the Civil Law is an effort to break
this patrimonial heritage and to embrace the significance of the person
rather than simply guaranteeing property rights and the right to transfer
property to another person.
It is important to note that the effort is to "repersonalize" the law,
and not to "personalize" the law. The latter notion would suggest
movement toward the autonomous, rational, individualistic and abstract
notion of selfhood that arose during the Enlightenment as a rejection of
hierarchical conceptions of the subject. The Enlightenment conception
of the individual played a central role in liberalism, and continues to be
important in the West. However, this abstract concept of the human
person proved insufficient to deal with problems that followed in the
wake of industrialism. Although all persons were regarded as equal
bearers of civil rights in an abstract sense, there was no equality in
economic and social relationships. Equality could no longer be viewed
simply as freedom from governmental coercion, particularly in countries
such as Brazil that have a dramatic concentration of wealth and power.
This context has led to the idea that the parties to a contract should be
viewed concretely in their differences, rather than abstractly as equal
rights-bearing subjects. Cross-cultural exchange in the age of
globalization has revealed the need to recognize the concrete
idiosyncrasies of others. Although much more could be written on this
theme, for present purposes it is enough to note that by using the word
"repersonalization" rather than "personalization," this article participates
in the effort to develop a new conception of the human person that
extends beyond the Enlightenment concept.
II. "Repersonalization" of Civil Law and the "Person"
In current legal debates in Brazil, there is an evident intensification
of the chorus calling for a cardinal role for the notion of the "human
person." Hymns of praise and joyful singing are intoned on behalf of the
fundamental dignity of the human person in a democratic state, and the
notion is viewed as connecting the constitution and private law, such that
the sharp dichotomy between these areas of law is called into question.
In the dialogue calling for attention to the promotion and protection of
the human person, phrases such as "the functionalization of private law"
and "the constitutionalization of private law" are used especially in
connection with property and contract law. But there is a lack of depth
in these intonations. Too often, the promotion and protection of the
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dignity of the human person is invoked as an empty phrase that
legitimizes virtually everything.4 If there is any concept that should not
be relegated to a sterile and idle chatter, it is the concept of the human
person, which touches on ethical, political and legal considerations. This
is particularly true in our age of globalization, in which social systems
exhibit stratification and exclusion and appear not to take full account of
Kant's moral categorical imperative to treat each individual as an end
and not a means.5
History is replete with dramatic paradigm shifts in our
understanding of the human condition, and so the ongoing effort to
repersonalize Civil Law by transforming our conception of the human
person is by no means a unique event. The problem at hand is
4. In fairness, there also is much good work on this theme, and I do not wish to
suggest that the constitutionalization discourse in Civil Law is wholly inadequate, or that
the attempt to steer the legal system toward the dignity of the human person is wrong.
The point is that there is urgency to developing this theme with greater detail and
complexity without taking matters for granted. Important work in this field includes:
Luiz EDSON FACHIN, TEORIA CRiTICA DO DIREITO CIVIL, [Critical Theory of Civil Law]
(RIO DE JANEIRO RENOVAR 2000); ORLANDO DE CARVALHO, A TEORIA GERAL DA
RELACAO JURiDICA-SEU SENTIDO E LIMITES, [The General Theory of the Legal
Relation-its sense and limits] (2nd ed., Coimbra: Centelha 1981); CARLOS FERNANDEZ
SESSARAGO, DERECHO Y PERSONA [Right and Person] (2nd ed., Trujillo-Peru: Normas
Legales 1995); INGO WOLFGANG SARLET, A DIGNIDADE DA PESSOA HUMANA E OS
DIREITOS FUNDAMENTALS NA CONSTITUIIqAO FEDERAL DE 1988, [The Dignity of the
Human Person and Fundamental Rights in the Federal Constitution of 1988] (Porto
Alegre: Livraria do Advogado 2001); JUDITH MARTINS-COSTA, A RECONSTRUCAO DO
DIREITO PRIVADO, [The Reconstruction of Private Law] (So Paulo: Revista dos
Tribunais 2002).
5. See IMMANUEL KANT, FUNDAMENTACAO DA METAFSICA DOS COSTUMES E
OuTRos ESCRITOS, (Sdo Paulo Martin Claret 2003), translated in IMMANUEL KANT,
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL SCIENCE (Michael Friedman trans. ed.,
Cambridge U. Press 2004) [hereinafter KANT]. We will return to Kant's categorical
imperative, but at this point it is important to note that concrete existence clashes with the
imperative, and that there is a need for a thorough and sensitive investigation of the
human person. Dramatic changes in biotechnology have already compelled a
reconsideration of the human person. Lucien Srve writes:
When personal and corporal death are no longer co-extensive, when a
grandmother carries to term and gives birth to the son of her daughter, when
frozen human embryos are stored, when the Pandora's Box of our genomes is
opened, how could we avoid disturbing our representations of ourselves,
rendering our relationships unstable, and calling into question the fundamental
traits of the human condition? The understanding of the person ha[s] never
been so disorganized, and these confusions become all the more significant
when they resonate with the vast and profound crises of society that threaten to
tear the social fabric by unseating traditional conceptions of marriage, work,
schooling and politics and leaving in its place only economic reality as the
master value, leading to a general condition of inhumanity. Can individuals
remain unscathed with these seismic shifts taking place?
LUCIEN StVE, PARA UMA CRiTICA DA RAZAO BIOtTICA, [A Critique of Bioethical Reason]
89-90 (Lisboa: Piaget 1997) [hereinafter S-VE].
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inattention to these deeper questions. Even as the phrase, "human
person," is utilized in discourse, too often it occurs in the context of an
illusory complacency that can't break free of old concepts.
Alternatively, the transformation of the concept is warped by an
unthinking narrow-mindedness that doesn't take account of the broader
significance of ongoing transformations in society.
We may begin by noting that the phrase "human person" would
appear strange to many readers: after all, aren't human beings the only
"persons?" As Hattenhauer reminds us, though, in some archaic cultures
animals and even objects were considered to be persons. It is only with
the rise of western theology that it became dogma that all human beings,
and only human beings, are persons.6 The conquest of America and its
abundant natural resources led to the conclusive moment for fixing this
dividing line in order to facilitate the exploitation of nature through
mercantile capitalism and to address the question of whether indigenous
people should be considered persons.7 If the indigenous people were
recognized to be human persons (even if savages), then it was clear that
there is something in the concept that unites all human beings and
constitutes "humanity," something beyond group, tribal or community
6. Hattenhauer writes,
... in the legal world a long time was needed for the concept of person to
remain circumscribed to human beings. The foundations are found in modem
theology, singularly in Thomas Aquinas (1225-1273). In all the pages of the
Bible, the Church leaders saw written that man was a creation of God and that,
even as a creature, he was at the same time king and master of creation. What
differentiated man from God was that he was created, and what differentiated
him from the other animals was that he had the divine gifts of reason (ratio).
HANS HATTENHAUER, CONCEPTOS FUNDAMENTALES DEL DERECHO CIVIL-INTRODUCCI6N
HISTORIcO-DOGMATICA, [Fundamental Concepts of Civil Law-Historical-Dogmatic
Introduction] 14-15 (Barcelona: Ariel, 1987) [hereinafter HATTENHAUER].
7. A famous debate took place in the Spanish city of Valladolid in the years 1550
and 1551 between the theologian and jurist, Juan Gines de Sepilveda and the Dominican
friar Bartolom& de las Casas. The debate resulted from the growing dissatisfaction
among the clergy generated by the increasingly violent actions undertaken by the Spanish
conquistadors against the indigenous Indians. Sepfilveda argued that the Indians were
halfway between men and animals, and clearly were inferior to the Spanish
conquistadors. He drew on Aristotle's opinions about slaves and barbarians to argue for
the legitimacy of a war against them, a war which would in fact be an act of
emancipation. Bartolom6, known as the first defender of human rights in America,
offered a detailed rebuttal that lasted five day, in which he used Aristotle to answer every
one of his opponent's arguments. He concluded that the Indians were much more faithful
and religious than the Spanish who waged war against them, and were thus more
distanced from the characteristics of wild beasts. For more on this debate, see Jos6
Carlos Moreira da Silva Filho, Da 'invasdo' da Am&ica aos sistemas penais de hoje: o
discurso da 'inferioridade' latino-americana in, ANTONIO CARLOS WOLKMER,
FUNDAMENTOS DE HIST6RIA DO DIREITO, [From the 'Invasion' of America to the Modern
Penal Systems: the Discourse on Latin-America Inferiority, in Foundations of the History
of Law] 279-330 (2nd ed., Belo Horizonte: Del Rey, 2002).
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identity. Modern philosophy provided a secular adjunct to Christian
universalism, and eventually the word "person" came to be understood as
pointing toward a cultural construction that rises above mere genetic
structure.
The human person might be studied as a biological entity, a
philosophical concept, and a legal subject.8 Conflicts between these
different senses of the human person are inevitable, particularly in light
of the tendency of the philosophical concept to range from the
rationalism of Kant to existentialist thinking. Before concentrating on
the philosophical and legal aspects, it is fitting to reflect on the human
person as a biological fact. Given the intense research in the field of
biotechnology, it is a common error to regard the human person as
merely biological, a reductionist approach that will be termed
"biologistic." This article will challenge the biologistic conception of the
human person from the perspective of Martin Heidegger's hermeneutical
phenomenology. 9
III. The Inadequacy of the Biologistic Conception of the Human Person
The biologistic approach to the person attempts to define the human
person solely by reference to biological facts resulting from belonging to
the human species.10 This wholly scientific-natural view of the human
person attempts to make other perspectives of the person obsolete.1
8. The importance and depth of this issue suggests many other possibilities for
focused discussion, including pedagogy, psychoanalysis, and even art. For present
purposes however, this article will only suggest these extensions.
9. Lucien S~ve undertakes a similar approach by using categories originating from
historical materialism. See SEVE, supra note 6.
10. It is important to reemphasize that this article does not question the significance
of biological investigation. Instead, the purpose is to criticize a "biologistic" ideology that
reduces the human person solely to biological data. The article will argue that biological
capacities show themselves only within cultural contexts, and therefore that these social
characteristics are important for understanding the human person.
11. In his acceptance speech upon receiving the Kyoto Award in 2004, Habermas
criticized the efforts by neurologists to reduce the role of free will and voluntariness in
human actions by focusing on biochemical reactions that take place prior to any
"voluntary" thinking.
When reason and its logical use are looked down upon as epiphenomena, there
isn't much left of the causal role of self-perception of subjects who are capable
of talking and acting. From the neurobiological point of view, reasons have
only a descriptive role as to behavior that is produced in a non-conscious
manner and explained neurologically. This begs the question why reasons have
assumed such significance in the past, and why the association of opinions,
reasons and actions has arisen. Reductionist strategies of research question
whether one of the two epistemological perspectives may be left by the side, or
whether we depend on a complementary crossing of both of these perspectives
on knowledge about human persons. Rejecting the epistemological duality of
knowledge perspective would mean that the corresponding language games and
[Vol. 25:2
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This perspective suggests that humans have inborn characteristics that
can surface independent of history and social context. The modem
efforts of hermeneutical philosophers to distinguish the epistemology of
the sciences from the epistemology of the spirit have challenged the
biases of biologistic thinking. For example, in his "life-philosophy"
Wilhelm Dilthey attempted to understand human persons within their
history rather than as simply natural objects. 12  This form of inquiry
suggested that there are two distinct forms of inquiry: the natural-
scientific inquiry and the sciences of the spirit.
Martin Heidegger's groundbreaking work overcomes this tendency
toward epistemological dualism that has become part of common sense,
without reducing either perspective to the other. Heidegger's concept of
Dasein ("being-there") signals his insistence that any understanding we
gain of the world around us or of ourselves is already supported by a
world that precedes and sustains us. This world, however, cannot be
understood as an objective description of all beings in their substance,
but rather, "the one 'in which' a factual being there lives in his condition
of being there. World has a pre-ontological existential meaning.,
13
Human beings do not simply exist; their way of existing is to guide
themselves in a historical trajectory based on the understanding they
have of the world, other human beings, and their own nature.
Furthermore, this existential understanding is not chosen since the ability
the explanation models cannot be reduced to each other. Thoughts do not
permit translation without a semantic balance in a vocabulary fit for things and
events. This raises the question whether we should contemplate the world
simultaneously from both perspectives in order to be able to apprehend more
accurately. We are at the same time observers and participants of
communication.
Jiirgen Habermas, Die Freiheit, die Wir Meinen, DER TAGESSPIEGEL ONLINE (Berlin,
Nov. 14, 2004), http-/archiv.tagesspiegel.de/archiv/14.11.2004/1477636 (last viewed Oct.
14, 2006).
12. Dilthey places fundamental significance on the historicity of experience rather
than on the correspondence of scientific investigation and the objective world. The
historical world is not an external, objective fact; instead, historicity defines the
development of spirit. Historical knowledge is possible because of the homogeny of the
subject and object. Dilthey's unique approach looked to the manner in which a person
acquires the vital context from which knowledge may emerge. The notions of a "life-
philosophy" of "experience" makes it clear that we need more than natural science to
investigate the human condition. This approach looks not to a transcendental historical
subject, but rather to individuals emerging within a historical nexus. Dilthey does not
attempt to understand spirit through categories and methods exterior to spirit, but rather
by working from within the constitution of spirit. See WILHELM DILTHEY, INTRODUCTION
TO THE HUMAN SCIENCES: AN ATTEMPT TO LAY A FOUNDATION FOR THE STUDY OF
SOCIETY AND HISTORY (Wayne State U. Press 1988).
13. See MARTIN HEIDEGGER, EL SER Y EL TIEMPO (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura
Econ6mica 1997), translated in MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (Joan Stambaugh,
trans., S.U.N.Y. Press 1996) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER].
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to choose is itself premised on a previous understanding that is given by
the historical and cultural context as communicated through language.
According to Ernildo Stein,
... the arguing manner that locates the deliberation and rationality as
phenomena caused genetically is strongly suggested in a kind of
vicious circle when it states that the thinking human being is
determined genetically. It doesn't realize that what it thinks
"genetically" already anticipates and transcends the genetic order.
The genetic element that is stated as a cause of deliberation dips
already in a preunderstanding, in an auto-understanding that
anticipates it as an a priori. We couldn't talk about the genetic
without it being preceded by something belonging to the order of
deliberation, that is pre-understanding. Such a difficulty forces us to
realize that human life isn't reduced to the materiality of the
biochemical thing, the demand being formulated that human life be
constituted by the fact that the human being must understand himself
previously... thus, deliberative human life exceeds the bio-chemical
datum, adding to itself the self-understanding which is more than the
genetic components. Human life means more than the adding up of
genetic elements that serve as its vector.
14
In other words, with the development of self-consciousness perception is
always mediated by the senses and transmitted to the individual through
the historical-cultural horizon in which he or she exists. This horizon
surpasses the individual's genetic constitution as soon as he or she comes
into contact with others through the mediation of the senses.15 The term
"senses" is not used in a reductionist biologistic manner, but rather to
encompass the "common sense" that is conveyed to the individual from
14. ERNILDO STEIN, EXERCiCIOS DE FENOMENOLOGIA-LIMITES DE UM PARADIGMA
[Exercises in Phenomenology-Limits of a Paradigm] 183 (Ijui: Unijui 2004).
15. Castor Ruiz develops this theme in an enlightening way:
The relation of the person with the world is never going to be something that is
given naturally, and the person's knowledge is never simply a matter of a
natural adequacy of the intellect to objective reality since this adequacy is
always mediated by the senses. This disrupts the natural condition of truth that
has been a basic presupposition of traditional philosophy. There is no longer a
natural truth, there is no single form of truth because there is no adequacy from
the intellect or from the person to reality; what exists is a meaningful
mediation. The human being doesn't couple the objective facts of nature, he
interprets them; he never receives them naturally either by reason or by the
senses, he mediates them by the senses. Each person must be a hermeneuticist
as a condition for interacting with the world in which he or she lives .... For
us there is no natural world since our world is always a sense of the world.
CASTOR BARTOLOME Ruiz, A filosofia, a verdade e o sujeito, in INACIO HELFER, Lutz
ROHDEN, URBANO SCHEID, 0 QUE t FILOSOFIA?, [Philosphy, Truth and the Subject, in
What is Philosophy?] 30 (Sdo Leopoldo: UNISINOS 2003).
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the very beginning of contact with others. 16
The central aspect for investigating the person is alterity. Umberto
Eco explains that this is not an imprecise sentimental propensity,
but rather a founding condition. As even the least technical among
the sciences teach, it is the other, it is his gaze that defines and forms
us. In the same way as we are unable to live without eating or
sleeping we cannot understand who we are without looking at and
answering the other. Even the one that kills, rapes, steals, and beats
up others does so in exceptional moments and, for the rest of his life
he will be begging for approval, love, respect and praise from his
fellow men. And even from those he humiliates he asks for the
recognition of fear and submission. In the absence of this recognition
the newly-born infant abandoned in a forest will not humanize
himself.
1 7
Notwithstanding their genetic constitution, children who grow up apart
from any human companionship do not behave as ordinary human
beings. Many documented cases prove this fact, including the so-called
"animal-children" (as exemplified in the famous account of Amala and
Kamala) and also children that grew up almost totally isolated from
human contact (as exemplified in the famous account of Kaspar Hauser).
Two children found living together with a pack of wolves on the
outskirts of the village of Godamuri, India in 1920 are the archetypical
"animal-children." Reverend Singh, who accompanied the excursion and
recorded his impressions in a diary, reports that he had the feeling that
the two children were
two "monsters," one much smaller than the other, whose faces were
hidden by their tangled hair and who were walking on all fours. Both
of them behaved exactly like the wolves. As they came out of their
cave, they put their heads out first and looked around before leaping
out. 18
The two children were captured and brought back to Reverend Singh's
16. The existential "being with" (mitda-sein) indicates that it is the world in each
and every case that one shares with others as part of one's "there being." See
HEIDEGGER, supra note 14.
17. UMBERTO Eco, Quando o Outro Entra em Cena, Nasce a Etica, in UMBERTO
Eco, CARLO MARIA MARTINI, EM QUE CRtEM OS QUE NAo CRtEM?, [When the Other
Enters the Stage, Ethics are Born, in What Do Those Who Don't Believe Believe?] 79-90
(9th ed., Rio de Janeiro: Record 2005).
18. LUCIEN MALSON, As CRIANCAS SELVAGENS-MITO E REALIDADE 68 (Porto
Livraria Civilizago 1967), translated in LUcIEN MALSON, WOLF CHILDREN AND THE
PROBLEM OF HUMAN NATURE (Edmund Fawcett, Peter Ayrton, & Joan White trans., New
Left Books 1972). In this book, Malson supplies a table that lists a number of similar
cases, ranging from children brought up by bears and sheep, to children raised by
panthers, baboons and leopards. Id. at 80-82.
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orphanage in the city of Midnapore, where the younger child was named
Amala and the older child was named Kamala. Singh's harrowing
description confirmed that both children effectively inhabited their world
as animals.
With both of them, the skin on their hands, knees and elbows was
heavily calloused. Their tongues hang out through thick red lips,
they panted and frequently bared their teeth. They suffered from
photophobia and day-blindness, and spent their days crouched in the
shade or standing motionless with their faces to the wall. They
livened up at night, howling and groaning and hoping to escape.
Amala-aged one and a half-and Kamala-aged eight and a half-
slept only about four hours in twenty-four. They had two means of
getting about: on their knees and elbows for short distances and on
their hands and feet for longer distances or for running. They lapped
up liquids and took their food in a crouching position. Their
exclusive taste for meat led them to indulge in the only activity of
which they were capable: chasing chickens and rooting around for
carcasses or entrails.'
9
This episode confirms that merely because people possess the
genetic conditions that enable them to walk upright and to develop
language and reasoning does not lead to a manifestation of the
characteristics of human beings. Such manifestation is made possible by
the cultural inculcation of senses and ways of being that permit
individuals to become human beings.2°
The case of Kaspar Hauser is more complex than the animal-
children scenarios. On May 26, 1828, a sixteen or seventeen year-old
19. Id. at 68-69. Amala died one year after being found. Kamala remained
prostrated and secluded for weeks, but slowly began to interact with the Reverend's wife
and with other children in the orphanage. She learned how to communicate, at first
through gestures and eventually by means of a few words that she managed to learn. She
also learned, in a very basic way, to express her emotions. After a few years, she learned
to walk upright, although she retained a certain wolfish style. Nine years after having
been found with the wolves, Kamala died without ever having exhibited more than very
rudimentary human features.
20. Lucien Save comments that,
... not having evolved among men, these little girls are totally "wolfisized."
Against obstinate beliefs about their human nature, their case shows in a quite
evident way the extension and depth of how social reality shapes the person:
not only good manners, language, and sociability, but also peculiar traits which
might even be considered as exclusively biological, such as standing upright,
being omnivorous, and having a full range of sensations and emotions. In all
these respects, the human offspring is "totipotent." ... Heroines of an
involuntary anthropological experiment, they teach to whoever cares to listen to
them that our effort to understand thinking must move from biology to
biography.
See SEVE, supra note 6 at 47.
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boy was found in Nuremberg standing motionless, although wavering as
if drunk, and holding a letter addressed to local authorities. The letter
recounted that he had been raised in seclusion, but the man who raised
him could no longer do so. The letter suggested that Kaspar be placed in
the care of the cavalry, because Kaspar always said that he wanted to
become a horseman like his father. However, Kaspar could not
communicate and could barely stand up. The judge with jurisdiction
over the case-Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feurerbach, father of the
philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach and president of the court of appeal at
Ansbach-provided the original account of the case. However, his
description was soon joined by numerous accounts, including poetry
(Rilke and Trakl, in particular), and even motion pictures.2' Ultimately,
the literature included Kaspar's autobiography.
Subsequently, it was discovered that Kaspar had been kept prisoner
in a cellar and that his only human contact was with his jailer.22 Through
this minimal contact he had learned a few words: "Horseman I want,
like father was," and "horse" (referring to his only toy, a small wooden
horse). Kaspar was first taken in by his former jailer, and ultimately by
Georg Friedrich Daumer, who had been a pupil of Hegel and Schelling.
The young Kaspar began to learn some behavioral habits and he quickly
learned the German language, including the ability to read and write.
After a while, he developed a sense of religion and otherwise became
acclimated to the social norms of his time. He was a novelty, and as
news spread, he was visited by many people curious to see him. He
proved to be very good at riding and taming horses.
Raffaelli provides an enlightening description of the strange manner
in which Kaspar apprehended his world:
Kaspar, although not stupid or insane, was almost completely lacking
in concepts and words and showed a totally missing familiarity with
commonplace objects as well as with natural events. Therefore, he
21. Werner Herzog's motion picture, Jeder fir sich und Gott gegen alle [The
Enigma ofKaspar Hauser] (1974), is faithful to the historical accounts and especially to
the sensitive manner in which the subject is depicted. The leading actor, Bruno S., lends
authenticity to his character by virtue of having spent a considerable part of his own
childhood in a mental institution.
22. Rafael Raffaelli has built a persuasive argument based on an array of evidence,
including recent DNA testing, that Kaspar Hauser was the son of Stephanie Adreienne
Napoleone de Bauhamais, the adopted daughter of Napoleon who was married to Karl,
Archduke of Baden. Motivated by the desire to prevent the prince from ascending to the
throne and to advance the position of her son Leopold in the line of succession, the
Countess of Hochberg apparently substituted the ill son of a gardener for the prince, who
was taken away to captivity. RAFAEL RAFFAELLi, A In&cia do imagindrio, in CADERNOS
DE PESQUISA INTERDISCIPLINAR EM CIINCIAS HUMANAS, [The Inertness of the Imaginary,
in Notebooks of Interdisciplinary Research in Human Sciences] No. 59, 1-23
(Florian6polis UFSC, Nov. 2004).
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could easily be taken for "an inhabitant of another planet." During
his period in prison he didn't have any self-consciousness and didn't
see himself as something separated from his objects. Later, in
Nuremberg, he didn't know how to differentiate the size of objects
seen from a distance and believed that objects had their own will ...
When a mirror was placed in front of him he touched his reflection
on the polished surface and then began looking for the person he
imagined hidden behind it. Kaspar didn't know how to differentiate
men' and women except for their clothing. He felt attracted to
feminine clothes-much more colorful-and even mentioned later
the wish of becoming a girl in order to be able to wear this kind of
garment.... It was only much later that he could distinguish
between a life of vigil and a dreamlike activity.... Kaspar talked
about himself employing only the third person and had difficulties
understanding "I" and "you."... At first, Kaspar had problems
seeing landscapes, open spaces with a variety of figures. A quiet
rural scene disturbed him in such a way that he avoided looking out
through the window.
23
Perhaps the most poignant indication of his distress came when Kaspar
had acquired clear awareness of his condition; in the Herzog movie, he
would ask his mentor with great difficulty and suffering: "Why is
everything so difficult for me?" Kaspar stayed relatively isolated in his
world, maintaining close contact only with the animals and men who
played a fatherly role in his short life. In his autobiography, Kaspar
reports that during his captivity he didn't know the world and didn't
think or dream.
Although dramatic, this story confirms that the world is not simply
an objective substance placed in front of the human eye, but instead is
the amalgam of perceptions of nature, objects, self and others that is
mediated by a sense that is culturally developed. Only a "being there"
has a world in the sense that human beings have a world, and "being
there" reveals itself as comprised of an existential understanding that
cannot be understood in a biologistical manner, because it extends
beyond bio-physiological existence.
IV. The Person as "Detached" and "Undifferentiated" Conscience
Hannah Arendt has characterized the philosophical motif of
modernity as the universalization of doubt.24 A constellation of events
and shifts in culture led to this new worldview: the Protestant
23. Id. at 19-21.
24. HANNAH ARENDT, A CoNDIrAo HUMANA 260-292 (10th ed. Rio de Janeiro,
Forense Universitdria 2001), translated in HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION
280-284 (2nd ed., U. of Chicago Press 1998) [hereinafter ARENDT].
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Reformation dislodged foundationalism in religion, the great navigations
revealed a new configuration of the planet and introduced new and
different cultures to western civilization, scientific and technological
advances expanded the gap between the world of appearances and the
world as understood, and Ren6 Descartes called into question the very
foundation of reality.25 The only means of addressing such radical doubt
is to begin with the rational consciousness that does the doubting ("I
think, therefore I exist"). But by beginning with the cogito, Descartes
effectively projected its computational nature onto the external world,
which then was understood in terms of the logic of mathematics.
Descartes concluded that the processes of consciousness have a
particular certainty and can be the object of an introspective
investigation.26
Charles Taylor argues that modernity gives shape to a tendency
toward insularity that had been forming since Platonic idealism,
27
anchoring the external order (nature, God) in the foundation of subjective
consciousness. This process culminates with the emergence of a self that
is completely detached not only from all others, but also from one's own
body.28 The self is like a geometric point, lacking any dimension.
Because this abstract consciousness is removed from everything and
freed of the body and its passions, it is capable of rendering everything
into an object that can be controlled and dominated. A radical polarity is
established between subject and object, resulting in a corresponding duel
between the philosophies of radical subjectivism and radical
objectivism. 29
John Locke completes the portrait of a subject that objectifies reality
25. As is well known, radical Cartesian doubt expresses itself in the possibility of an
"Evil Genius," that is, of a Creator that makes beings long eagerly for truth but without
ever being capable of reaching truth. In his Third Meditation, Descartes answers this
doubt by offering a "proof' for the existence of God based on the cogito. RENE
DESCARTES, Meditap8es, in DESCARTES--OS PENSADORES, [Meditations, in
DESCARTES-THE THINKERS] 277-296 (Sao Paulo: Nova Cultural 1996).
26. ARENDT, supra note 25 at 292.
27. Taylor argued that Plato internalized the search for truth because he
recommended introspection as a method for the known ideas in the intelligible world to
be recollected (in the end, an external truth). In St. Augustine, this turn inward was
recommended so that a meeting with the word of God may take place (also a truth
situated externally from man). In Descartes, this process finally culminated in the search
for the mechanisms of human reason themselves (located in the mind) and this completed
the process of interiorizing truth. See CHARLES TAYLOR, AS FONTES DO SELF: A
CONSTRUCAO DA IDENTIDADE MODERNA, [The Fountains of the Self: A Construction of
Modern Identity] (Sao Paulo Loyola 1997) [hereinafter TAYLOR].
28. Id. at 223.
29. The objectivity of this Cartesian world and of its notion of substance (res
extensa) is brought to light in confrontation with the Heideggerian world in paragraphs
18 and 21 of Being and Time. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 14.
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by remaining detached from existence, for in his hands the human mind
itself is transformed into an object. In his famous book, Essay on Human
Understanding, Locke argues that ideas are not innate, but rather are
produced in the mind through experience as simple ideas, and later
become increasingly complex through mechanical associations.30  His
goal is to discard the pre-reflexive knowledge sustained by tradition and
to replace it with solid and reliable procedures of thinking. Toward this
end, the subject is summoned to take responsibility for himself, to
become aware of and to exercise his autonomy. For Locke, the person is
this autonomous subject. He posits the intimate relation between our
concept of self and our moral self-understanding. The person is the
moral agent that takes on responsibility for his actions in the light of a
future retribution. 31 Because we construct a description of reality
according to the rules of thought rather than by contemplating a
preexisting order, reason is eminently procedural in Locke's account. To
reform the world by reason, man must remain aloof from himself;
consciousness must be completely detached.
Paul Ricoeur discards this concept of the self at the very beginning
of his important book, Oneself as Another, when he proposes to develop
a hermeneutics of the inquiring self. He argues that the "I" that
entertains radical doubt and is reflected in the cogito is a hyperbolic
metaphysical construction lacking content; in fact, this subject isn't
anybody.32 The cogito entertains the question "what am I?," but does not
pose the question "who am I?" The Cartesian answer to the first
question is that "I" am "a thinking something." Identifying the subject in
this way places it outside of the concrete existence of a physical body
with a lived history among a diversity of persons. The ahistorical self is
an undifferentiated sameness.
Taylor uses the English word self to refer to the cogito and other
aspects that set the limits of interiority, building toward his notion of
authenticity. This usage corresponds to the Portuguese word si or the
French word soi. In Ricoeur's hermeneutical philosophy, however, the
self is expanded to encompass two different senses. One sense points to
the same (the mesmo in Portuguese, the gleich in German or the idem in
Latin) and the other sense indicates selfhood (the ipseidade in
Portuguese, the selbst in German and the ipse in Latin). For Ricoeur,
30. JOHN LOCKE, ENSAIO ACERCA DO ENTENDIMENTO HUMANO 29-137 (Sdo Paulo:
Nova Cultural, 2000), translated in JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING (Oxford U. Press 1975).
31. Id. at 226.
32. PAUL RiCOEUR, 0 SI-MESMO COMO UM OUTRO 16 (Campinas: Papirus 1991),
translated in PAUL RICOEUR, ONSELF As ANOTHER (Kathleen Blarney trans., U. of
Chicago Press 1992) [hereinafter RICOEUR].
[Vol. 25:2
THE HUMAN PERSON AND OBJECTIVE GOOD FAITH
there is the identity-idem which brings to the surface the figure of the
same or sameness, but there also is the identity-ipse which points to the
figure of the ipse or selfhood. For the former, it is a question of "what"
the person is; for the latter sense, there is room to inquire "who" the
person is. After exploring this notion of sameness, in the next section of
the article I elucidate the notion of selfhood by confronting the
inescapable reality of alterity. Having developed a full concept of the
person, the final section will then bring this understanding to bear on the
principle of good faith as utilized to structure legal-contractual relations.
Sameness indicates the stability and durability of identity, or the
return of the same through time.33 Ricoeur uses the term character to
represent this concept, and he defines it as "the conjunction of distinctive
marks that allows the re-identification of a human individual with the
same." 34  Character is acquired through habit, transforming all
innovation (ipse) that might arise over time as something that may be
connected to the same. This dialectic of habit and innovation reveals the
historical quality of the character, precluding assimilation without any
questioning to a separate and external subject. Although sel_[hood tends
to be eclipsed by character, in fact sel/hood is a fundamental prerequisite
for the formation of character. We can regard the character as the
"what" of the "who," as the part of one's identity that identifies itself
with what always remains the same.
Kantian moral philosophy is often invoked in Brazilian legal
discourse about the dignity of the human person (sometimes only for
rhetorical effect), providing a means of locating the mark of the idem
within the notion of person. The prescriptive norm-making dimension of
human action is essential for the notion of person, as this brings to light
one's interaction with others. In this context, Kant made a unique
contribution by emphasizing the inevitability of the deontological
dimension, which focuses on duty and responsibility. Duty imports
within it the idea of the need to respect others precisely because each is a
human person.
In Kantian terms, the respect owed to persons is based on an
unconditional principle that cannot be subject to the fluctuations of time
or other factual circumstances. Duty operates in the field of morality
(Moralitdt), which is freely accepted once reason outlines the dimensions
of duty. The unconditional character of such duty ensures that one's
inclinations are subsumed to a categorical command of morality. To
33. This notion is found in several kinds of identity, such as numerical identity
(permitting recognition of the same thing countless times), qualitative identity (external
similarity), and the uninterrupted continuity between the first and the last stage of
development of a considered individual. Id. at 140-42.
34. Id.
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determine whether a certain precept or maxim (as designated by Kant) is
acceptable or moral it must be submitted to the proof of universalization,
according to which only the precept that is valid as a norm in all
situations and for all persons may be considered to be moral. The
formulation of the first Kantian categorical imperative is therefore to act
as if the maxim of your action should become, through your own will, a
universal law of nature.35 In this respect, the will represents a true
practical reason, common to all rational beings. Such practical reason is
valid when it operates in accordance with the laws of reason and submits
to moral constraint, which can occur through the procedure of
universalization. In the last analysis, it is whoever establishes this moral
constraint, this obligation, that is the person. Kant internalizes in the
person both command and obedience and indicates that the will is only
free when it obeys its moral conscience and when it doesn't yield to the
convenient inclinations of the moment. This moral conscience is taken
in turn as a fact of reason: that is, something that simply exists and must
be assumed as a given fact.36
Kantian conscience justifies the dignity of the human person,
because when man conforms to conscience rather than simply submitting
to rules he enjoys autonomy and becomes truly free. This self-legislation
of conduct may be directed toward indefinitely numerous ends, matter or
objects, and is not an empty formalism. Moral autonomy situates people
within a realm of ends, and leads to the second categorical Kantian
imperative, already mentioned above, that demarcates the respect of the
self (the object of the universalization rule) by pointing toward respect
for the other, for reciprocity.
We see the emergence of setJhood in the Kantian moral conscience
because it is based on the necessary ascription (attestation) of an action
to someone (the "who" relative to the ipse). However, the difficulty in
effectively accounting for the alter threatens to dissolve this selfhood
into undifferentiated sameness. This difficulty, according to Ricoeur,
expresses itself in the concept of humanity that Kant added to the notion
of pure autonomy, aiming at the contemplation of the distinctness of
35. KANT, supra note 6 at 52.
36. Srve criticizes this notion of a "fact of reason," and instead regards
consciousness as a historical construction. The French philosopher questions, "[w]here is
the proof that this supposed a priori fact isn't in reality reason itself, a conquest of the
collective and individual conscience. . ., the aptitude for universalizing the maxim of an
action ceases to appear as a faculty of pure reason and begins to be understood as a
biographically formed historical capacity. Neither its full identity in time or in social
space nor its true independence related to the cultural contexts are guaranteed. Morality
is a fact of civilization and its value is not at all less because it is produced and not given,
but its universalist reach must be considered in totally different terms-not as received
lately but rather as constructed." StvE, supra note 6 at 175-76.
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people. But in the end, even this move leads to the universality of
humankind and does not provide the necessary space for effectively
considering the differences among people. Thus, the self implied
reflexively by the formal imperative didn't have a monological nature
but one simply indifferent to the distinction of people.37 It is at this level
that the idem aspect of the Kantian moral identity can be perceived.
We can clarify this distinction by considering the morality of
promising as the basis for contract liability. Kant emphasizes the
importance of keeping promises by focusing on the trustworthiness of the
promissor more than on the expectations or confidence of the promissee,
and in his estimation all people are the same with respect to their moral
standing. However, by grounding this principle through universalization
we lose sight of another trajectory, the application of the maxim to a
particular case. It is at the level of application that the alterity of people
arises, and the reason for keeping a promise finds another justification:
the fulfillment of the expectations of the other.38 Both the circumstances
and the consequences of actions must be assessed in light of both guiding
points, so as to fix the boundaries of behavior properly. There is an
additional consideration at the institutional level: the need to respect the
social-historical horizon within which communities sustain themselves.
In the following section, I analyze the identity-ipse to determine a more
adequate way of harmonizing these different considerations.
V. The Person as an Existing Selfhood: the Moment of Alterity
When identity is examined under the focus of the idem, the person
is something that we talk about rather than somebody who talks. We
understand the person by attributing to him a series of qualities that
characterize him. As Ricoeur demonstrates, the tendency of
philosophers has been to provide an analytic and decontextualized
characterization of the person, but once we face pragmatic considerations
it is possible to emphasize the notion of ascription.39  Ascription is
attributing the predicate of an action to a single person who is perceived
to be a physical and psychological unity, which is to say an agent with
motivation for acting. Ascription overcomes the tendency to suspend
attribution; this suspension occurs, for instance, in the abstract way in
which passions sometimes are treated as realities in themselves,
separated from any particular person.
In moral terms, ascription permits imputation. There is always
37. R1COEUR, supra note 33.
38. Id.
39. Ricoeur develops a particular kind of attribution by drawing on P.F. Strawson's
philosophical explorations.
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someone to whom a definite duty is attributed, to the extent that we
derive moral selfhood from Kantian moral conscience. With Kant,
though, the action's singular moment is no longer the main issue as the
focus is dislocated from the authorship of action within a unique and
existential moment to the universal characteristics that define the action.
Action appears as the return of the same, that is, the universal aspects
that shape all specific identities. So, the who is not the existential subject
who performs the action, but instead is characterized in abstract terms.
Ricoeur captures the action's singular and existential moment by
moving beyond ascription to a deeper level which he terms attestation.
Attestation suggests that the ipse is not smothered by the idem, and the
self is identified with the given word rather than with the character.
Ricoeur doesn't confuse identity with something that could be generally
perceived, but instead looks to the "who" and an idea of existence rather
than one of universal substance. The persistence of this kind of identity
through time is achieved by the word that has shaped it and the word it
formulates, leading to an awareness of identity. Self-awareness is thus
deeply immersed in temporality, and Ricoeur looks to Heidegger's
existential analysis of being there (Dasein) for guidance.
Heidegger investigates the "who" of Dasein in § 25 of Being and
Time. Heidegger rejects the notion of the "who" as an object in the
world that is completely available to one who perceives. Instead, the
"who" transcends existence in some manner. Beyond the everyday and
pragmatic meanings that entities (including men) have for others (the
quality of being ready-to-hand), and even beyond the crystallized
accounts provided by scientific and philosophic concepts and theories
(the quality of being present-at-hand), the "who" has other basic
dimensions that cannot be rendered manifest. Philosophy can refer to
this dimension and the meanings of everyday life can open up this
dimension, but it is only in the existential reality of living that this
dimension is realized. Every individual knows that the meanings that
guide her are not the product of her own will or consciousness; rather,
subjectivity is built by meaning itself, such that one always finds oneself
already thrown into a meaningful horizon. Moreover, all persons are
mortal, and so all meanings and projects can, and ultimately will, come
to an abrupt end.
By acknowledging these two existential limits (our thrownness and
our being-towards-death), Heidegger establishes that we no longer can
identify ourselves with absolute determinations. Our existential
condition is that we are possibilities projected into the world, not as a
natural fact but rather as a reciprocal process of being built and being a
builder at the same time. Heidegger designates being-in-the-world as a
main component of Dasein. Prior to possibilities is the potentiality-for-
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being; prior to the project is the projective character of Dasein. At this
fundamental level it is vital to acknowledge that the meaning of the
world is a shared meaning, and that consciousness takes shape in our
primordial being-with others (Mitsein). As a basic component of Dasein,
Mitsein gives rise to recognition of the existential and temporal character
of existence that we share with others, and leads to mutual respect.
The "who" of the Dasein is located in an existential consciousness
of himself (Gewissen), in the care (Sorge) or in one's self maintenance
(Selbstdndigkeit). Heidegger writes:
If the "I" is an essential determination of the "being there," then an
existential exegesis is to be made. Then, the question of the "who"
can only be answered by verifying phenomenally a certain form of
the being in the "being there." If only by existing is the "being there"
in each case "itself," then so much the period in force of the
"himself' as its possible "state of not being itself' are required and
then the question should be raised about an ontological-existential
way of being as the only adequate access to the problems generated
by it.n°
For Ricoeur, the existential analysis of the "who" that is Dasein clearly
indicates the ontological status of selfhood (Selbstheit).4 It is important,
however, that we do not permit the attestation to become a sterile
abstraction. Attestation requires the stability introduced by the sameness
and so attestation must maintain a steady dialogue with sameness without
permitting itself to be cancelled. A dialectic is thus installed between the
two forms of identity.
It is only through the pole of selfhood that the question of alterity
can be adequately situated. An "other" is one who shares the form of
being as Dasein, and so is perceived as being himself and not as being
42the same. Alterity, understood as this strangeness that disrupts the
same, doesn't pertain only to others, but also to one's own consciousness
(in the existential sense) and to one's own body.43 There is then an
alterity of itself and an alterity diverse of itself
40. HEIDEGGER, supra note 14.
41. RICOEUR, supra note 33.
42. When perceiving others on the unauthentic (uneigentlich) level of what is before
your eyes, the self ends by being swept away by the people (das Man), that is by the
comfortable uniformity of a "common sense."
43. When discussing the alterity of one's own flesh as a "body," Ricoeur
demonstrates that when you insert the question of the body into the dialectics of sameness
and selihood it is possible to escape Edmund Husserl's dilemma about how to reconcile
the body ("another I" that is seen in space along other bodies) and flesh (an "I" that
cannot be seen and which is outside the objective spatiality, the one that suffers). The
flesh undertakes the mediation with the physical world. RICOEUR, supra note 33 at 377-
80.
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These dimensions of alterity reveal its phenomenological character,
a concrete form of being perceived as attestation. This form of being
goes beyond the self by recognizing that there is something diverse as to
which one is at the same time distinct and dependent, the flesh, the
conscience, the other. A second dialectic is thus installed, the one
verified between selfhood and alterity. Such a dialectic dismisses for
good the cogito from the central post it has held since Descartes and also
prevents the self from resuming this role and thereby suffocating the
alter.
Emmanuel Levinas incisively treats passivity in its concrete form of
understanding alterity. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas discusses the
clash between totality and exteriority in the same vein as between the
same and the other. Here the other can only prevail in his condition as
face, or epiphany (something that cannot be perceived as a phenomenon),
revealing the superiority of ethics over understanding (gnosiology).44
The other must be accepted with total passivity by the "I" because the
other confronts the I from exteriority. Levinas installs an absolute
separation between the I and the other, making it impossible for any
complete mediation that would reduce the other by absorbing it into the
same.
Ricoeur argues that even after Levinas had fixed the boundaries of
the passivity of the I when it faces the alter in such a sharp and
hyperbolic manner (understood as the call towards a responsibility when
confronting the other, in the manner of an injunction), he doesn't leave
any room for making a distinction between the se/f and the I, and doesn't
see selfhood as an opening in which the other can be accepted without
being suffocated or absorbed into sameness and in which the self
undertakes the responsibility that it is enjoined to accept. In contrast,
Ricoeur proposes a "dialectic crusade" of the itself and the diverse from
itself 5 that includes the movement of the other toward the same as much
as from the same toward the other.
When facing the other we receive an injunction with an ethical
dimension. This is joined to the passivity in which the self is perceived
in its condition of a dialectic pole between selfhood and alterity. At this
point we may return to something that had been considered at the end of
the previous section: when the ethical level is introduced, the other
effectively shows up at the moment that universal maxims are applied to
particular cases and when it is necessary for a moral judgment in a
44. EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALIDADE E INFINITO 176-80 (Lisboa Edig6es 70, 1988),
translated in EMMANUEL LEVINAS, TOTALITY AND INFINITY: AN ESSAY ON EXTERITY
(Alphonso Lingis trans., Duquesne U. Press).
45. RICOEUR,supra note 33 at 396.
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particular situation. This activity is designated by Aristotle as phron~sis,
the emergence of ethical judgment within a context that is sensitive to the
salient features, including the existence of others and a communal sphere
of norms that can be described in some respects as teleological.
In The Ethics of Authenticity, Charles Taylor shows that an ethic
that turns toward the affirmation of the self on the level of authenticity
must realize that consciousness is, from the very beginning, in the
presence of others. The origin and development of thought, and
consequently of autonomy, are dialogic. Authenticity is impossible
without being in dialogue with others, but the ethic of self-affirmation
too often devolves into narcissism and disregard for others, manifesting
the central mistake of contemporary culture that ends by destroying
authenticity itself. Taylor reminds us that we live in a time when
identity, formerly grounded in a cosmic or theological order, is now
grounded through reflexivity on the interiority of consciousness.
Because the measure of identity is now the individual, recognition by
others has become a critical problem. Non-recognition, or incorrect
recognition, is perceived as an offense and a threat to the survival of
authentic identity. This trend is corrosive of the individual to the extent
that withholding proper recognition can lead one to self-depreciation.
Taylor properly notes that the battles over authenticity, autonomy and
recognition can only make any sense against a shared horizon. If we
consider autonomy independently of the horizon upon which it rests we
find only an autonomy placebo, which permits a choice to be made
regarding insignificant questions (like choosing from the menu at
McDonald's) or the choice itself becomes irrelevant.46
All this leads to the conclusion that there is a pressing need to think
of autonomy broadly, in terms taking into account the alterity perceived
in selfiood that leads, as designated by Ricoeur, to an autonomous
solidarity in which the single individual no longer is self-sufficient. It is
a "dependence according to exteriority" that reshapes the Kantian
relation between autonomy and heteronomy. Heteronomy is not
inevitably a challenge to autonomy; in fact, the positive dimensions of
heteronomy reinforce autonomy. By incorporating the dimension of
selhood in the notion of person we better situate alterity and thus
provide a basis for understanding the respect owed to others. From this
vantage point we reveal the concrete, existential and relational character
of the human person that can serve as an adequate basis for promising
46. Taylor states this concisely, "[t]hings take on importance against a background
of intelligibility. Let us call this a horizon. It follows that one of the things we can't do, if
we are to define ourselves significantly, is suppress or deny the horizons against which
things take on significance for us." TAYLOR, supra note 28 at 37.
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developments in the Civil Law. In the next section I consider how the
task of re-personalization can be explored in the context of contract
relations by developing the ethical requirement of good faith.
VI. Good Faith in Contract Relations: A New Focus on Selfhood
Kantian moral philosophy, in which the person is characterized by
his capacity of taking responsibility for his actions, was central to the
modem construction of the legal subject of rights. In the nineteenth
century, however, attention shifted from the person as a theoretical and
ethical construction to a more functional configuration of the person.
After this shift, the subject of rights became defined as the connection
that unites correlative rights and obligations, such that a group of
terms-including person, subject of rights, and legal subject-began to
be used interchangeably as part of a functional account.4 7
Functionalism means that the legal relation takes precedence over
the place of the person. This development originated in the historicism
of Savigny, in which law is considered to be a phenomenon that arises
within the historical reality of institutions and peoples, and is no longer
regarded as being founded on rational human nature (although Savigny's
method for studying legal phenomenon is extremely rationalistic and
deductive). The systematization of this view overcame the notion of
lifeworld ("Lebenswelt") championed by Dilthey. The misguided nature
of this approach is emphasized by Orlando de Carvalho:
Not life but rather life in relation gives birth to Law and therefore
only at the level of inter-human relations can Law be correctly
understood. Despite the soundness of this idea, Savigny and his
successors put it aside in favor of the method that they considered
scientific-the reduction of legally relevant material to general-
abstract concepts-and thereby Savigny transposed the idea of legal
relation to general-abstract concepts to the point that the concrete
richness of the idea of legal relations became unrecognizable.
48
These developments ultimately removed the concept of the person from
the field, demoting it from a central and superior notion to serve only as
an operational concept. 49 Along these lines, Hattenhauer writes:
47. HATTENHAUER, supra note 7 at 19.
48. ORLANDO DE CARVALHO, A TEORIA GERAL DA RELACAO JURiDICA-SEU SENTIDO
E LIMITES, [The General Theory of the Legal Relation-Its Meaning and Limits] 45-46
(2nd ed., Coimbra: Centelha 1981).
49. This development led to the concept of tie legal person, divorced from the
substratum of human life, which motivates my use of the expression human person. The
conclusive blow for a more compact perspective of the person was delivered by the
norm-setting system of Hans Kelsen and his The Pure Theory of Law, in which he
consolidated the notion of a self-regarding legal system separated from the social and
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Savigny didn't address the person and its definition; he talked about
people only in the plural form. He needed at least two of them for
building a legal relation. People became building material,
indispensable for larger scale purposes. People no longer were the
foundation of Law because their salient attribute was the ability to
engage in legal relations: the concept of legal ability.
50
The person as a concrete individual living with others had disappeared
from the legal scene.
After the horrors of the Second World War, legal theorists began to
see the need to restore the concepts of the person and human dignity.
This rethinking of the subject, especially in the field of Civil Law (the
classical legal niche where the person lodges), did not amount simply to
recovering the jusnaturalistic notions which had slowly devolved into a
mere operational and secondary aspect. Rather, there was an effort to
rethink the status of the person in a fundamental way; this effort became
known as the re-personalization of law. One of the most striking
strategies in this direction was to closely link Civil Law and
Constitutional Law. At this time, constitutionalism was also being
reformulated with the goal of transforming the Constitution into
something more than the Statute of the State, such that the Constitution
would play an important role in the promotion and protection of the
dignity of the human person.
51
We can see this development at work in the specific field of contract
relations, where there has been a growing appeal to consider the person
as something more than an operational concept or an element of the legal
relation. On one hand, there is the constitutional emphasis on the dignity
of the human person. On the other hand, the growing awareness of the
complexity of contract relations that persist over time and involve
sophisticated interaction among all the members of the contract has led
to the development of relational theories of the contract.52 These two
axiological areas of knowledge. HANS KELSEN, THE PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967).
50. HATTENHAUER, supra note 7 at 20.
51. In this respect, see the brief and didactic analysis by DANIEL SARMENTO,
DIREITOS FUNDAMENTALS E RELACOES PRIVADAS, IFundamental Rights and Private
Relations] 69-131 (Rio de Janeiro: Ld'men Jfdris 2004).
52. Teresa Negreiro's work, FUNDAMENTOS PARA UMA INTERPRETA(,AO
CONSTITUCIONAL DO PRINCiPIO DA BOA-Ft, [Foundations for a Constitutional
Interpretation of the Good Faith Principle] (Rio de Janeiro: Renovar 1998).is well known
for linking a constitutional analysis of this principle to contract relations. As for the
connection of the good faith principle to relational theories of contract, Ronaldo Porto
Macedo, Jr. has developed many insights that draw from the work of Ian MacNeil. Here
is a particularly insightful passage:
There are elements that make evident the importance of good faith within the
relational perspective, mainly the fact that in first place it reminds the
incompleteness of contracts, the limits of the human capacity to foresee, the
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developments converge in the notion of the good faith principle in
contract relations.
The requirement of good faith, especially when construed
objectively, is the paradigmatic indication that there is a social and
institutional need for contracting parties to trust each other, and for
certain parameters of behavior that transcend the will of the parties.
However, such parameters cannot simply be frozen in some wholly
objective representation at the time of contracting. Analyzing the
doctrine of good faith increasingly requires an analysis of the elements
peculiar to each contract relation, the parties to that contract, and the
changing circumstances that affect them. The duty of good faith refers
not to the abstract and fixed moment of formal contract formation in
which the parties are judged as contracting agents, but rather to the
unfolding time that leads to and follows contract formation as
experienced in the daily lives of the parties.
53
In this new environment, the predictability of contract relations is
not achieved by reaffirming the initially stipulated clauses in a formal
and atemporal manner. Rather, predictability is achieved by recognizing
the ongoing relationship between the parties that sometimes leads to
revision or alteration in order to secure the intended objective of the
contract. More than ever, contracts are subject to rapidly changing
circumstances, and the economic relations supported by the contract
require flexibility and adaptability. For example, if a borrower is unable
to make payments as required by a loan agreement because, after
borrowing the money, he has been laid off and can't find another job (a
situation that is virtually a structural aspect of modem society,
particularly in an economy such as Brazil's), the creditor has much more
to gain if it renegotiates the terms of the contract rather than remaining
costs and threats to solidarity, the insurmountable barriers for a perfect and
silent communication. In the second place it emphasizes, increases the value
and makes the element of trust legally protected. Without this no contract can
operate. In the third place, it makes evident the participating nature of the
contract which involves many meanings and social practices, language, social
norms and non-promising linking elements (non-contractual). Thus, the good
faith highlights the element of contract relations. Finally, contractual good
faith involves a moral conception for doing something correctly and in this
sense reports itself to a concept of Social Justice....
RONALDO PORTO MACEDO, JR., CONTRATOS RELACIONAIS E DEFESA DO CONSUMIDOR,
[Relational Contracts and Consumer Defense] 231 (Max Limonad ed., SAo Paulo 1998).
53. Franqois Ost ironically notes that the traditional notion of contract is based upon
the autonomy of the will; the bringing of a contract into actual existence doesn't take
place abruptly (like love at first sight), the temporal dimension of contract formation is
linked to human finiteness and concreteness. FRANCOIS OST, Tiempo y Contrato-Critica
del Pacto Fdustico, in DOxA, CUADERNOS DE FILOSOFIA DEL DERECHO, [Time and
Contract-Critic of the Faustian Contract in Doxa, Comments on the Philosophy of
Law] No. 25, 607 (Madrid: Universidad de Alicante 2002).
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resolutely attached to the initial terms. Cooperation, trust and mutual
adjustment are not simply altruistic behaviors. These characteristics are
critical even under a pessimistic conception that regards contracting
parties as antagonists seeking to maximize their own advantage.
Francois Ost explains the shift in focus from the unitary moment of the
perfect legal act of contract formation to the ongoing experiences of
selfhood as developed in Ricoeur's philosophy.
Seeking to insulate itself within the "perfect" moment of the legal act
of formation, the classical approach to contract law relied on a
conception of "untouchable selfhood"-whatever may happen in life
after formation, the contract would persist unchanged. However, this
approach underestimated the imperfections of all our undertakings
and predictions, the underdetermination of our intentions, and the
inevitable contingencies of unforeseen events. And so, clinging
strictly to the terms of the agreement removed from the temporal
dimension of real life, classical contract law risked drowning the
spirit of collaboration upon which the contract relation is based. By
re-establishing the imperfect nature of the contract, the modem
concept of the contract recognizes the selfhood of the relationship-
that is, its capacity to remain the same and at the same time reinvent
itself in another way, when circumstances demand such adjustment.54
This contract selflood referenced by Ost is, in fact, the selfhood of the
parties to the contract, and so provides a more solid foundation to the
notion of person that is at the core of contract law. Working from this
notion of selfiood, space opens in which to consider alterity in
contractual relations.
In Brazil, the objective good-faith principle is relatively new. The
principle had been used with some regularity after enactment of the
Consumer's Defense Code in 1990. The principle was reinforced by
adoption of the new Brazilian Civil Code in 2002. 55 The introduction of
this principle in the written law is understood as a kind of authorization
from the legislature to jurists, and especially judges, to elaborate the
meaning of objective good faith in contract law on a case-by-case basis.
The principle of objective good faith has been applied in two
different ways, first, as a limitation on the assertion of rights by one party
to the contract, and second, as a source of new obligations in the
contractual relation. An example of the first kind of method is seen in
cases involving substantial performance, which is called "substantial
accomplishment of the contract" in Brazil. In these cases, the
54. Id. at 613.
55. Article 422 provides that parties to a contract must adhere to the principle of
honesty and good faith in the execution and performance of the contract.
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performance of one party is incomplete but substantially fulfilled. In this
situation the party who has not received full performance cannot cancel
the contract unilaterally, although the creditor may receive damages for
the delay. The determination of what constitutes substantial performance
is determined on a case-by-case basis. For example, in Brazil there is a
form of contract called a fiduciary alienation that is principally used in
the sale of cars and real estate. Generally, the law provides that if the
debtor fails to make any payment the creditor may terminate the contract
and seize the property that is the subject of the sale through a summary
judicial process called "search and apprehension." Courts have decided
that when the debtor has made a substantial number of payments (for
example, fifty-six of a total of sixty payments owed), the creditor cannot
terminate the contract by means of "search and apprehension" because to
do so is contrary to the ethical standards of society.
An example of imposing new obligations on the parties to a contract
is seen in cases involving a judicial requirement of disclosure of
important information regarding the contract. For example, a bank was
held to have a duty to inform an investing customer fully about the
capitalization schedule for monthly payments over five years that
resulted in her receiving only sixty percent of her payments when she
sought to end her relationship. The judge held that the bank had not
properly informed its client, and had in fact induced her to understand
that she would receive a refund of her money at the end of the plan by
use of the following advertisement, "[i]t's not a savings account, it is a
capitalization title with money raffles. At the end of five years you will
receive your capitalized funds." In addition, the bank's employee paid
no attention to her particular condition; she was an elderly and humble
woman with little formal education. In these circumstances, the judge
determined that the bank's employee must explain the contractual
provisions more carefully. Because the bank's conduct failed to meet the
principle of objective good faith, the bank was required to refund all of
her money with interest.56 The principle of objective good faith has been
used in a number of cases that involve loan agreements.
As these cases demonstrate, the principle of objective good faith is
connected to the re-personalization of the law because it calls for a focus
on the reality of the relations between the parties rather than a literal
reading of the contract terms. The courts do not disregard the language
of the contract; instead, the courts consider the contractual language in
56. Juizado Especial Civel de Canoas-RS, Apela do Civel No. 8195704765,
Relator: Clademir Missaggia, 1993 (Irena Friedrich v. Lideranga Capitalizaqdo S/A)
(Brazil).
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light of the circumstances of the parties and their relationship. 57
The re-personalization of the law looks to recover the basis of the
reciprocity and trust that underlies contract relations. In principle, the
contractual promise is a giving of one's word, and there is a moral basis
for enforcing the promise because the other party is entitled to count on
another's promise under the principle offidelity. When the word of the
promise receives the legal provision for enforcing obedience it becomes
a full contract. At this moment the expectation that the promise
generates for the other is transformed into a right, a claim enforceable by
law. It is precisely here that the focus on the subjective right tends to
obscure the moral roots grounded in solidarity from which the contract
springs.58 The legal system must refuse to close down in this manner,
and must embrace the contract relation as one of autonomous solidarity.
VII. Final Considerations
As the re-personalization of law continues in Brazil, it will be
extremely valuable if the law takes account of the human person as we
exist, rather than as an abstract bearer of legal rights. Adopting this
approach does not mean that we must reject the legacy of traditional
legal thinking. By questioning the assumption of the cogito and an
insular account of individual autonomy we are not recommending that
western culture (and cultures like Brazil, which are permeated by
countless non-western influences) attempt an impossible return to a
previous stage of development that rejects all manner of Kantian
influence. Nevertheless, we must proceed by rejecting the increasingly
unreal ideal of autonomy as self-sufficiency and turn instead toward a
realistic account of a mature consciousness (selfhood) that avows its
limits and its condition of finitude, because it is precisely in this avowal
that the self transcends itself in the perception of its existence, its very
flesh, its similarity. We must create a personalism that lives up to
Emmanuel Mounier's bold insistence that man is body and spirit, that
there is nothing about man that cannot be mingled with earth and blood.
The Mexican jurist, Jesus Antonio de La Torre Rangel, rescues
Mounier's community personalism for Law:
The central assertion of personalism is the existence of free and
57. From conversations with Professor Francis J. Mootz III, I understand that a body
of law known as "lender liability" developed to protect borrowers from bad faith
enforcement of the strict terms of loan agreements, but that there has been a trend back
toward a "plain meaning" approach by courts. In Brazil, this area of law has diverged.
There are judges who prefer to apply the strict terms of loan agreements (even when they
are abusive), and judges who prefer to pay more attention at the circumstances of the
parties and their relationship, as part of the re-personalization of law.
58. RICOEUR,supra note 33 at 311-13.
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creative people. It is considered difficult to give a definition of the
person since only the objects that are external to man and may be
placed in front of him can be defined. The person is not an object
and includes characteristics that cannot be objectified. The person is
not an object, but is rather what in each man can not be treated as an
object. Man lives a central paradox in his personal existence. Being
personal is the specifically human way of existing, but nevertheless
this personal existence must continuously be recalled so that man
does not become merely an object. 59
This perspective reveals itself as the adequate soil to bring forth
better understandings of contract relations as well as legal phenomenon
more generally. The developing doctrine of objective good faith focuses
attention on the changing relations between real persons composed of
flesh and blood, acknowledging the inevitable unpredictability of human
relations in light of our finitude. Good faith analysis suggests the
possibility of regarding social relations, even among people having
opposed interests, as resting on mutual trust that stands solidly on giving
one's word in a scenario of changing life rather than on the abstract level
of the perfect legal act. This change of perspective is justified both by
the present configurations of economic relations in market societies and
their inherent interests, and also by the longing for a better society in
which the law is put into service of the human person, rather than having
individuals dissolved into a sameness that then is subjected to the logic
of instrumental rules structuring an anonymous market.
59. JESUJS ANTONIO DE LA TORRE RANGEL, JUSNATURALISMO, PERSONALISMO Y
FILOSOFIA DE LA LIBERACION-UNA VISI6N INTEGRADORA, [Jusnaturalism, Personalism
and Philosophy of Liberation-an Integrational Vision] 65 (Sevilha: Editorial Mad
2005).
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